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POLICY BRIEF
“For” or “against” Europe? Dissatisfied with 
democracy and “against” the EU, like the populists 
on the left and right, or “pro” EU, like the moderate, 
mainstream parties? These divisions will shape the 
2019 European election campaign, but do they also 
reflect voters’ preferences? The results of a repre-
sentative 12-country survey on the European elec-
tions in 2019 show that this is not the case. If it were 
up to the voters, the divisions in the new European 
Parliament would run not only between populist and 
mainstream parties, but also between economically 
and culturally left-wing and right-wing camps. Left-
wing and right-wing populists only agree on their 
dissatisfaction with democracy and their EU scep-
ticism. On substantive issues, they are even more 
deeply divided than the electorates of mainstream 
parties. In their economic and cultural preferences, 
left-wing populist voters agree much more strongly 
with socialist, social democratic and green voters. 
Meanwhile, the preferences of right-wing populist 
voters are more similar to those supporting the 
Christian democrats and conservatives. Only liberal 
voters sympathise with the right on economic ques-
tions and with the left on cultural questions. For the 
new European Parliament, this means that without 
the populist parties at the margins, consensus and 
positive majorities are only possible through a grand 
coalition of most of the parties of the mainstream 
left-right spectrum. If this bridge cannot be built, 
negative majorities might lead to a self-imposed 
gridlock and stagnation in Europe. The stronger the 
populist-extreme forces become, the more likely it 
is that such a scenario becomes a reality. But Europe 
still has a choice.
Europe’s Choice 
Populist attitudes and voting intentions  
in the 2019 European election
Representation gaps cause populism: those who feel that they are poorly represen-
ted are more populist in their thinking and at the polls. The same also applies to the 
2019 European elections. However, populist citizens only agree on two things:  
they are sceptical towards Europe and dissatisfied with EU democracy. When it  
comes to substantive political issues, left-wing and right-wing populist voters are 
even more divided than the voters of the mainstream parties. This makes it more 
difficult to form new majorities in the next European Parliament.
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Representation and Populism 
 
Does a lack of representation intensify populist 
views? Does the perception that their own positions 
and interests are not adequately represented by the 
parties make people more populist? 
 
There has been plenty of speculation about these 
questions, much of it theoretically well-founded. 
Empirical evidence of a causal relationship between 
representation and populist attitudes has so far 
been scarce. Closing this research gap is one of the 
objectives of this study.
In order to investigate the causal relationship bet-
ween representation and populism empirically, we 
have designed and conducted an innovative survey 
experiment for this study.
The primary goal of the experiment was to randomly 
change people’s feelings of representation, in order 
to measure the extent to which populist attitudes are 
affected by a perceived lack of representation. For 
this purpose, respondents were first asked about their 
positions on various questions which play a role in 
public debate on the European elections. They were 
then shown randomly chosen party scenarios, which 
differed according to whether and how much their 
own position on a topic was represented by the parties 
of their country in the European election campaign. 
Respondents could then indicate the extent to which 
they felt represented by the parties of their country in 
this scenario. Finally, they were asked their opinion 
on various typical populist statements in order to 
ascertain the level of their individual populism. Using 
this experimental setup, we were then able to deter-
mine statistically whether perceived representation 
influences the level of populist attitudes: 
Do people who feel poorly represented express more 
support for populist statements?
The short answer to this question is: yes – at least 
those respondents who were not populist already.
The results of the analysis show that representation 
gaps can activate and reinforce populism. Poorer 
representation by political parties in a democracy 
can lead to an increase in populist attitudes. For the 
fight against populism, these results mean that good 
representation can help limit the spread of populist 
attitudes. If parties endeavour to reflect the various 
positions and interests in society and to represent 
them in the political process, they thereby contribute 
to countering the further spread of populist attitudes 
in representative democracies. 
But what does this mean when it comes to dealing 
with populist attitudes in the run-up to the 2019 
European elections?
Given these results on the connection between 
representation and populist attitudes, two things  
in particular seem important to us: 
On the one hand, our analysis shows that  
the parties’ efforts to ensure that voters feel  
Method: Structural equation models (SEM).
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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All analysis, data and figures in this POLICY BRIEF are based on the results of 
the study “Europe’s Choice – Populist attitudes and voting intentions in the 
2019 European election”, by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Robert Vehrkamp and 
Christopher Wratil, Gütersloh 2019. 
This text is a slightly shortened version of the Executive Summary of that study. 
The national samples of respondents are representative of the electorate in 
each of the twelve European countries surveyed. The survey was conducted by 
YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung in a survey wave in January 2019. 
A total of 23,725 respondents from twelve EU member states were intervie-
wed (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). 
For further details and for information about the methodology, see the section 
“About the study” and the methodological appendix of the study.
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represented are worthwhile. Representation  
counts! It is an important contribution against  
the further spread of populist attitudes among 
voters, and is therefore a goal which is worth  
every effort.
On the other hand, election campaigns are always 
a special opportunity to improve representation: 
by taking up and defining important issues, and by 
discussing them in controversial terms, political 
parties can improve voters’ sense of representation 
in election campaigns, and hinder the spread of 
populist attitudes.
But do voters make their voting decisions for or 
against a party? Do they vote for the party that  
best represents their interests, attitudes and  
preferences? Or are they more likely to vote  
against other parties whom they do not support 
at all and whose electoral success they want to 
prevent? We have examined these questions by 
empirically measuring and interpreting positive  
and negative party identities.
The (forgotten) relevance of negative partisanship 
 
There is no doubt that voters are showing  
declining levels of identification with mainstream 
political parties across Europe. But how are voters’ 
behaviour and decisions influenced by negative 
party identities, i.e. the explicit rejection of  
parties?
So far, there has been little empirical research on 
this subject in Europe. For this reason, in this study 
we have developed measures of negative and positive 
party identities for the twelve countries examined.  
A positive party identity is attributed to those  
respondents who state that they “definitely” would 
vote for a particular party in European, national,  
and regional elections. Conversely, we classify people 
as having a negative party identity if they have 
indicated for each of the three elections that they 
will “definitely not” vote for that party.
The figure at the bottom shows the average level of 
positive and negative party identities for each of the 
six main European party groups we have analysed.
It turns out: 
 Positive party identities are  
much less widespread than negative party  
identities. This may indicate that many citizens  
do not opt first and foremost for the party to  
which they feel most attached, but rather react 
against parties that they most strongly oppose. They 
may then vote for the party that seems to promise 
them the best protection against the  
parties they most strongly oppose and whose  
electoral success they therefore want to prevent  
at all costs.
 The level of positive partisanship of the two  
traditional party groups of the mainstream  
spectrum (i.e. social democratic and socialist  
parties as well as Christian democratic and  
conservative parties) is almost identical but  
significantly lower than the positive partisanship 
of right-wing populists and right-wing extremists. 
Populist radical right and extreme right parties  
face the highest proportion of voters with a  
positive party identity: 10.3 percent of the  
eligible voters interviewed in the twelve European 
countries surveyed identify positively with a  
right-wing populist or far-right party.
 The two party groups on the left and right margins 
not only face relatively high levels of positive party 
identities, but at the same time also have a parti-
cularly high level of negative party identities (52.2 
and 52.8 percent respectively). In other words, these 
party groups not only have a solid base of voters, but 
also have a large number of sharp critics. This also 
shows that the adaptation of the ideas and rhetoric 
Positive and negative party 
identities by party groups
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Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
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On economic and cultural questions, meanwhile, a 
more classic ideological left-right divide can be seen, 
with the supporters of conservative, populist radical 
right and extreme right parties at one end and the 
supporters of green, social democratic and socialist 
parties as well as populist radical left and extreme 
left parties at the other. 
The divide between the supporters of mainstream 
parties and those of populist and radical parties 
is very clear when it comes to support for EU 
membership. In line with other parts of the study, 
agreement with eight typical populist statements 
was used to measure how populist respondents were. 
This allows us to locate the supporters of the Euro-
pean party groups in a space defined by populism/
Euroscepticism:
The quadrants of the populism/Euroscepticism 
space, on page 5, reveal very clear that the populist/
pro-European quadrant and the nonpopulist/Euro-
sceptic quadrant are completely unoccupied.  
None of the party groups analysed is more populist 
than the average and at the same time more pro- 
European than the average, or less populist than the 
average and at the same time more Eurosceptic than 
the average.
The supporters of all party groups are thus located 
exclusively in the two remaining quadrants in the 
top right (= less populist and more pro-European 
than the average) or in the bottom left (= more 
populist and more Eurosceptic than the average).
The voters of all mainstream party groups can be 
found in the non-populist, Europe-friendly quad-
rant. Green and liberal voters are the least  
populist and most pro-European, while  
supporters of the group of Christian democratic  
and conservative parties are a little less populist 
than pro-European, compared to the average  
across the electorate. Socialist and social- 
democratic voters, meanwhile, are a little more 
remarkable in their pro-European position than  
their position on the populism dimension.
In the populist-Eurosceptic quadrant, on the  
other hand, we find the voters of left- and  
right-wing populist and radical parties. While  
their degree of populism is similarly high, they  
differ in the extent of their Euroscepticism:  
of these two party groups may be a risky strategy for 
mainstream parties, since a majority of voters firmly 
reject them.
Our results are also highly relevant to the 2019 Euro-
pean election campaign: against the background of 
decreasing positive partisanship throughout Europe, 
the mobilisation of negative identities could play an 
increasingly important role. Precisely in the con-
frontation between mainstream and populist parties, 
the mobilisation of negative identities in Europe 
seems to be becoming increasingly important:  
populist parties are mobilising against the main-
stream parties, while mainstream parties increa-
singly rely on the (counter)mobilisation of voters 
against the populist parties.
Which divisions result from this among voters, and 
how are they likely to shape the 2019 European 
elections and the new European Parliament?
Divided EU Parliament:  
populists against the mainstream?
Are the European elections above all a struggle 
between mainstream parties and populist parties, 
between “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics”,  
or even between “supporters” and “opponents”  
of democracy?
The overall picture shows that when it comes to  
attitudes towards the political system – that is, 
populist attitudes, satisfaction with democracy  
in the EU and support for membership of the EU –  
the divisions between party supporters are very 
different from those related to economic and  
cultural questions.
Looking at populist attitudes and attitudes towards 
the EU system, we find a clear polarisation between 
the supporters of mainstream parties (Christian 
democrats, conservatives, social democrats, liberals 
and greens) on the one hand and the supporters of 
populist and extremist parties – left and right –  
on the other. While the supporters of mainstream 
parties are predominantly satisfied with democracy 
and EU membership and show a low level of populist 
attitudes, the supporters of populist and extremist 
parties are more strongly opposed to EU member- 
ship, more dissatisfied with EU democracy, and  
more populist.
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the supporters of populist radical left and  
extreme left parties are much less Eurosceptic  
than those of the populist radical right  
and extreme right parties. Nevertheless,  
the supporters of both party groups are  
more Eurosceptic than the average of all voters  
and than the voters of all mainstream party  
groups.
When we consider how satisfied people are with  
the functioning of democracy in the EU, rather  
than support for EU membership, almost exactly  
the same picture emerges. 
In summary, then, the divide between main- 
stream parties and “populists and extremists”  
is very striking both on the question of support  
for EU membership and on general satisfaction  
with the functioning of democracy in the EU.  
These attitudes to the political system reveal two 
clearly separate party camps: the supporters of the 
mainstream parties stand in contrast to the populist 
and extremist camp on the left and right margins, 
who are Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy 
in the EU.
This is precisely the distinction between the 
“pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics” as well  
as the “mainstream” and “populist” parties that 
has increasingly been invoked in the current  
European election campaign, shaping political 
rhetoric.
But how similar are those who vote for populists on 
the left and right when it comes to economic and 
cultural issues?
In other words: How uniform is their vision for the 
future direction of European policy?
Left against right I – the economic dimension 
To answer these questions, it is helpful to look at  
the voters of the party groups before the 2019  
European elections according to their economic  
and cultural left-right preferences. For this purpose, 
two additive indices were generated in this study, 
which locate the preferences and attitudes of the  
party supporters on an economic and a cultural 
dimension.
As the illustration on page 6 shows, at the  
far left of the economic spectrum are the  
supporters of populist radical left and extreme  
left parties, with an average index value of 4.79.  
Right next to them are the supporters of the  
green parties (4.87), and soon after that come  
the supporters of the social democratic and  
socialist parties (5.16). These three party groups  
are clearly to the left of the average of all eligible 
A divided EU Parliament? – Euroscepticism 
Note: The dots show the weighted 
average for the voters of each party 
group, the axes show the weighted 
average of the whole electorate.
 
Target population: EU citizens eligible 
to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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considerable. A different picture emerges on the 
left and right side of the economic spectrum. There, 
the gap in political positions between voters in the 
economically left-wing and the economically right-
wing party camps is only 0.37 index points on each 
side. In summary, this means that the economic 
preferences of the party supporters of the two 
populist and radical party groups differ more than 
three times as much from each other as those of the 
supporters within the economically left and within 
the economically right party camps. 
Left against right II – the cultural dimension
A similar but not completely identical picture  
can be seen for the cultural left-right dimension  
in the figure on page 7: The locations of the respec-
tive supporters of the European party groups are  
first depicted on a cultural dimension from left to 
right. And here, too, a clear picture emerges: to 
the far left of this dimension, there are the green 
parties, whose voters have an average index value 
of 2.40 when it comes to cultural preferences. Not 
far away are the supporters of the social democratic 
and socialist parties (2.94), the populist radical left 
and extreme left parties (3.02) and the liberal parties 
(3.08). The supporters of these four party groups are 
thus clearly to the left of the average of the whole 
electorate (3.60). To the right, on the other hand,  
are the supporters of Christian democratic and 
voters (5.61). By contrast, supporters of populist  
radical right and extreme right parties (5.95),  
liberal parties (5.99), and Christian democratic  
and conservative parties (6.32) are clearly to the  
right of the average.
The overall depiction of the economic left-right 
dimension thus shows clearly that camps have  
been formed by the supporters of the two party  
groups regarded as being “left-wing” and the  
green party group on the left, as well as the two 
“right-wing” party groups and the liberal parties  
on the right.
This is also illustrated by the distance arrows  
between the different party groups, the length  
of which indicates how strongly the preferences  
of the voters of different party groups differ from 
one another. The preferences of the voters of the 
mainstream party groups are furthest apart in the 
figure, as the index value of Christian democratic 
and conservative party supporters deviates by  
1.45 points from that of the greens. The second  
largest distance on the economic left-right  
dimension is between the supporters of the two 
populist and radical party groups: here, the  
political distance between the supporters of populist 
radical left and extreme left parties and the sup-
porters of populist radical right and extreme right 
parties is 1.16 index points, which is likewise very 
Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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conservative parties (3.79) and, to the far right, the 
voters of populist radical right and extreme right 
parties (4.55). In cultural terms, the supporters of the 
liberal parties therefore position themselves clearly to 
the left of the average. The supporters of the liberal 
parties are thus the only group to defy clear over-
arching left-right classification, since they appear 
economically right-wing and culturally left-wing.
Thus, in cultural left-right preferences, there is  
once again a contrast between the supporters of 
the two left-wing party groups and the green party 
group as well as the liberal parties on the left side  
of the cultural left-right dimension and the two 
right-wing party groups of the Christian democrats 
and conservatives as well as the right-wing  
populists and right-wing extremists on the  
right side.
However, a different picture emerges within the cul-
turally left and right spectrum. There, the political 
distance between the voters within the cultural left 
(0.68) and within the cultural right (0.76) is only 
about half as great.
In summary, this means that the cultural preferences 
of the voters of the two populist-extreme party 
camps differ about twice as much from each other  
as those within the culturally left-wing and within 
the culturally right-wing party camp.
Consequences for the new EU Parliament
What can be deduced from these results for the 
coming European Parliament?
In theory and purely in terms of voter preferences, 
new coalitions in the European Parliament are  
conceivable in economic and cultural matters – for 
example between Christian democrats/conserva-
tives and right-wing populists, whose voters are 
sometimes closer to each other in cultural matters 
than the voters of some mainstream parties. But 
the past shows that most mainstream parties are 
reluctant to form coalitions with populists and 
Eurosceptics. It is not by chance that the data of this 
study show that left and right populist parties have 
particularly high levels of negative party identities. 
Especially in the European Parliament, the pro- 
European consensus of the mainstream parties 
has strong binding force and has repeatedly taken 
precedence over ideological differences between 
mainstream parties. Even during the financial crisis, 
when highly controversial economic questions 
had to be decided, the mainstream parties in the 
European Parliament preferred to compromise among 
themselves on the economic dimension rather than 
involve EU opponents and populists. Coalitions based 
on the “Austrian model”, as exemplified by the ÖVP 
and the FPÖ, are therefore unlikely in the European 
Parliament even after 2019.
Culturally left or right?
cultural
left
cultural
right
Christian democratic
and conservative
parties
Populist radical right
and extreme
right parties
Populist radical left
and extreme left parties
Green
parties
Social democratic
and socialist
parties Liberal parties
2.942.40 3.02 3.08 3.79 4.55
Mainstream parties
Populists
cultural rightcultural left
Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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and EU scepticism remain the populists’ only and 
greatest common denominator. The populist-extreme 
“anti-EU camp” remains a fiction when it comes to 
concrete issues: left-wing and right-wing populist 
voters are even further apart in their preferences 
regarding such issues than the mainstream parties of 
the moderate left-right spectrum.
For the new European Parliament this means that 
consensus and positive majorities are only possible 
with broader coalitions of mainstream parties. 
Without the populist-extremist margins, positive 
majorities could in future require consensus  
between socialist, left-alternative, green and  
social-democratic parties, all the way to Christian 
democratic and conservative parties. The stronger 
the populist-extremist margins become, the more 
this forces mainstream parties to reach consensus in 
“grand” coalitions. If the mainstream parties do not 
succeed in building this bridge, negative majorities 
will lead to self-imposed gridlock and stagnation in 
Europe. The stronger the populist-extremist margins 
become, the more likely this scenario will be. But 
Europe still has a choice.
Conclusion: Conflict or consensus in the  
new EU Parliament?
Poor representation creates populism. Conversely, 
this means that good representation is an excellent 
strategy against populism. But good representation is 
not an easy business in democracies. It requires those 
who are represented to give their consent and believe 
in the legitimacy of the system. If people do not feel 
adequately represented in the diversity of their inte-
rests and attitudes, this creates dissatisfaction with 
and criticism of democracy. Representation deficits 
activate and trigger populism.
Populists on the left and right then use such repre-
sentation deficits for their own purposes. This will 
also shape the European elections in 2019, where 
they will benefit from the vulnerabilities of the 
mainstream parties. They defend the supposedly 
“true” interests of an allegedly “homogeneous” 
people against a supposedly “corrupt and evil elite”. 
They turn voters’ perceived representation deficits 
into populist criticism of the EU and its democratic 
system. However, dissatisfaction with democracy 
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